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Abstract
Social engineers attempt to manipulate users into undertak-
ing actions such as downloading malware by clicking links
or providing access to money or sensitive information. Natu-
ral language processing, computational sociolinguistics, and
media-specific structural clues provide a means for detecting
both the ask (e.g., buy gift card) and the risk/reward implied
by the ask, which we call framing (e.g., lose your job, get a
raise). We apply linguistic resources such as Lexical Concep-
tual Structure to tackle ask detection and also leverage struc-
tural clues such as links and their proximity to identified asks
to improve confidence in our results. Our experiments indi-
cate that the performance of ask detection, framing detection,
and identification of the top ask is improved by linguistically
motivated classes coupled with structural clues such as links.
Our approach is implemented in a system that informs users
about social engineering risk situations.
1 Introduction
Social engineering (SE) attacks are a significant cyberse-
curity threat, putting individuals and organizations at risk.
Social engineers attempt to manipulate users into under-
taking actions such as downloading malware by clicking
links (PERFORM) or providing access to money or sensi-
tive information (GIVE). Such eliciting behaviors, or asks,
are not always explicitly stated in text (Drew and Couper-
Kuhlen 2014a), but may be gleaned through automatic tech-
niques that employ both linguistic and structural knowl-
edge. Natural language processing (NLP), computational so-
ciolinguistics, and media-specific structural clues provide a
means for detecting both the ask (e.g., buy gift card) and
the risk/reward (or LOSE/GAIN) implied by the ask, which
we call framing (e.g., lose your job, get a raise). These ele-
ments can be used in downstream operations for countering
attacks, e.g., through bot-produced responses and actions.
Interest in conversational intelligence has surged in recent
years as evidenced by the ConvAI2 NeurIPS competition
(Dinan et al. 2019; Yusupov and Kuratov 2018) and related
efforts in natural language dialogue (Perera et al. 2017). We
build on prior Cyber-related dialogue work (Dalton et al.
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2019), focusing on critical conversational objectives beyond
NLP-based cyber-attack detection and prediction (Dalton et
al. 2017; Perera et al. 2018; Hollingshead et al. 2019) or
NLP-based generation of warnings and the explanations be-
hind them (Kazakova et al. 2019). We implement a novel ask
detection approach with the ultimate goal of sustaining a be-
lievable conversation with a social engineer to extract their
true identity without putting valuable resources at risk.
Toward that end, we apply linguistic resources, includ-
ing Lexical Conceptual Structure (e.g., relating verbs such
as give, donate) (Dorr and Olsen 2018; Dorr and Voss 2018)
and categorial variation (e.g., relating word variants such as
reference, refer) (Habash and Dorr 2003). We also leverage
structural clues such as links (URLs, email addresses) and
their proximity to identified asks. Although the email chan-
nel is our starting point, we adopt such techniques with an
eye toward extensibility to channels beyond email (e.g., tex-
ting), but at the same time we identify techniques specific to
email, such as email signature and quoted reply removal. No
training data are needed for the approach described herein.
Table 1 shows representative system output produced by
our approach for four (presumed) SE emails. Framing output
sets the stage for the ask, i.e., the purported threat (LOSE) or
benefit (GAIN) that the social engineer wants the potential
victim to believe is dependent on compliance or lack thereof.
The output shows three PERFORM asks and one GIVE ask.
Information in parentheses () refers to one or more links that
the potential victim might choose to click.1 Links are de-
tectable from html mark-up whether or not their textual form
is used in the email body. Information in brackets [] refers
to the ask/framing category of interest to the social engineer
(e.g., finance money, personal, credentials).2
We describe multiple experiments to determine the impact
of linguistic and structural knowledge on ask/framing detec-
tion. Two key findings are: (1) Both linguistically motivated
classes (e.g., Judge, Want, Send) and verbal processing (e.g.,
filtering on the basis of part of speech) improve precision
1For space reasons, abbreviated forms “jw11@...” and “http...”
are used in the table.
2Experiments reported herein do not focus on such categories,
but these are shown for illustrational purposes. (Future work will
investigate the impact of such categories on response generation.)
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Email Framing Ask Conf
I am stuck at the air-
port. Please help me
out by sending $500.
LOSE
stuck()
[]
PERFORM
help()
[finance
money]
0.8
It is a pleasure to
inform you that you
have won $1.5M.
Contact me.
(jw11@example.com)
GAIN
won()
[finance
money]
PERFORM
contact
(jw11@...)
[]
0.9
Your dog could win
prizes. Vote now.
GAIN
win()
[]
PERFORM
vote
(http...) []
0.9
After you submit, we
will pick finalists in
each category. Users
will vote on their fa-
vorite three winners.
GAIN
pick()
[]
GIVE
vote()
[]
0.6
Table 1: Representative system output for four emails: fram-
ings, asks, and confidence scores. Parentheses () designate
clickable links (emails, URLs,...) and brackets [] indicate the
ask/framing type of interest to the social engineer.
and recall of ask and framing detection; (2) Structural clues
such as links provide a fuller context for asks (e.g., click
here) and improve precision and recall of “top ask” detec-
tion (i.e., identification of critical asks for downstream re-
sponse generation) from individual emails. These asks are
then converted to a threat-intelligence representation where
they make up the matchable pattern. Our approach is imple-
mented and currently under evaluation by prominent transi-
tion partners. An accompanying risk model ties the target,
and what is being asked of them, to an attack signature that
can be mapped to a threat actor; the mapping then reveals
other stages of the attack and what the motivation might be.
The next section presents the foundational background for
asks and framing. We subsequently present our approach,
focusing on the linguistic and structural knowledge adopted
into our solution and describing our algorithm with repre-
sentative examples. We present a range of experiments and
results and discuss the upshot of our experiments and present
related work, contrasting prior approaches to our own. We
conclude with ideas for future work. By-products of this
study are available at a website henceforth referred to as Ask
Detection webpage, for a larger project called PANACEA:
https://social-threats.github.io/panacea-ask-detection/.
2 Foundational Elements: Asks and Framing
The notions of ask and framing are defined as they pertain
to our task of ask/framing detection in the SE context.
2.1 What is an Ask?
The notion of an ask is closely related to the notion of a re-
quest (Zemel 2017). Four related phenomena are subsumed
under the heading of an ask: a) proposal, b) offer, c) request
and d) suggestion (Couper-Kuhlen 2014). An ask is an ac-
tion that “should be taken broadly to include other ways of
asking than speaking” (Drew and Couper-Kuhlen 2014b).
The nature of the action requested will influence both the
form of the ask and the nature of the expected and actual
response to the ask (Drew and Couper-Kuhlen 2014b). We
identify two ask types: a topical descriptor that specifies the
kind of thing being asked for (GIVE), and an action associ-
ated with its delivery or production (PERFORM). In SE at-
tacks, asks are routinely used to recruit recipients to perform
actions that provide money, information or system access.
Perhaps most importantly, an ask elicits relevant re-
sponses from the recipient, thus providing an opportunity to
generate responses that elicit information about the attacker
from the attacker. The same social obligation to respond to a
request that a social engineer uses to elicit responses can be
used to elicit information about the social engineer.
We have conducted pilot experiments with both staged
and “live” social engineering attacks and noted that gen-
eral conversational norms are observed, as expected. While
one or both sides of the conversation engage in deception,
they still need to accomplish their objectives, e.g., keeping
the conversation alive, and obtaining information they want.
Correspondingly, our approach treats ask/framing combina-
tions as sense-making practices. All actors rely on shared
knowledge of, and shared ability to recognize, how asks
and framings fit together in conventional ways to produce
meaningful interactions (Garfinkel and Sacks 1970; Pomer-
antz and Fehr 2011; Pomerantz et al. 2017; Sacks 1992;
Schegloff 2007). We rely on this understanding of commu-
nicative practice in designing our system to both recognize
and implement legitimate and deceptive messaging.
2.2 What is Framing?
Framing refers to linguistic and social resources used to per-
suade the recipient of an ask to comply and perform the
requested social action. An ask creates a social obligation
to respond, but does not necessarily provide an adequate
basis for compliance with the ask. An ask must be “con-
textualized” to be persuasive (Huma, Stokoe, and Sikve-
land 2019). Recognizing and producing framing thus signif-
icantly shapes the kind of response the ask makes relevant.
Framing and the particulars of ask-construction enable
creation of a “benefactive stance” (Clayman and Heritage
2014) that motivates compliance and also enables and con-
strains the ways that recipients respond (Huma, Stokoe, and
Sikveland 2019). This may involve asking a question that
makes production of an answer conditionally relevant. Al-
ternatively, the benefit or cost that purportedly may accrue
to the recipient (based on compliance or non-compliance)
provides the basis upon which performance of the ask can
be decided. Framing consists of just these specifications of
benefit (GAIN) and cost (LOSE).
Social engineers rely on the fact that we routinely (often
without much consideration) conform to social interaction
conventions based on the credibility of the framing used.
The efficacy of framing is not limited only to victims of SE
attacks. Asks and framing directed at social engineers make
them targets of counter-attacks.
a. Dependency:
b. Constituency:
c. Semantic role labeling:
help: [V:help][ARG1:me]out[ARGM: by sending $500]
sending: [V:sending][ARG1:$500.]
Figure 1: Dependency, Constituency, and Semantic Role La-
beling for Please help me out by sending $500
3 Approach to Ask/Framing Detection
This section describes our approach to ask/framing detec-
tion, starting with the application of linguistic knowledge
and structural knowledge, and finishing with a description
of the algorithmic steps and confidence score.
3.1 Application of Linguistic Knowledge
a. Basic Language Tools: Detection of the actions associ-
ated with asks and framing relies on constituency parses and
dependency trees, both taken from Stanford CoreNLP (Man-
ning et al. 2014). As shown in Figures 1a and 1b, both help
and sending are verbal (VB and VBG, respectively) and thus
are extracted as candidate ask actions. Arguments are ex-
tracted using semantic role labeling (SRL) (Gardner et al.
2017) (see Figure 1c), e.g., ARG1 ($500) is identified as an
argument of sending.3 The dependency tree may not always
yield all possible verbs, so back-off to the constituency tree
is sometimes needed. Also, when SRL is not able to popu-
late all arguments, the dependency tree is used to determine
arguments for each ask or framing action.
b. Thesaurus.com and Lexical Conceptual Struc-
ture: Two thesaurus-like baselines and an extended verb
classification (see Ask Detection webpage) are used to test
linguistic and structural constraints on ask/framing detec-
tion. The first is a standard but relatively robust thesaurus
3Arguments are assigned ask/framing categories mentioned
earlier (e.g., finance money, personal, credentials).
(thesaurus.com) that yields four lists based on asks (PER-
FORM, GIVE) and framings (LOSE, GAIN). Examples are
shown below (with total verb count in parentheses):
• PERFORM (44): achieve, act, do, execute, perform
• GIVE (55): commit, donate, grant, provide
• LOSE (41): expend, forefeit, squander, yield
• GAIN (53): clean, get, obtain, profit, reap
The second baseline is the STYLUS variant of Lexical
Conceptual Structure (LCS) (Dorr and Voss 2018; Dorr and
Olsen 2018), which groups verbs into classes according to
syntactic behavior and underlying semantic structure (Levin
1993). For example, verbs corresponding to GIVE include
those in classes such as Contribute, Future Having, and Ful-
filling. Some examples are shown below:
• PERFORM (214): ask, bring, execute, rate, redeem
• GIVE (81): administer, contribute, donate, furnish
• LOSE (615): penalize, stick, punish, ruin
• GAIN (49): accept, earn, grab, win
Due to their size and coverage, in comparison to the-
saurus.com, LCS classes are likely to predict more true pos-
itives, but also more true negatives, during ask/framing de-
tection. The benefit and main distinguishing feature of LCS
is its extensible organizational structure, which facilitates
rapid modifications due to the grouping of similar verbs.
An extended LCS classification (LCS+) was thus pro-
duced from suspected scam/impersonation emails collected
by PANACEA team members. Verbs from these emails were
tied into particular LCS classes with matching semantic
peers and argument structures (one person-day of effort).
Modifications and examples are shown below:
• PERFORM (6 del, 44 added): connect, copy, notify
• GIVE (no changes): Orig. LCS covers GIVE verbs
• LOSE (174 del, 11 added): deny, forget, surrender
• GAIN (no changes): Orig. LCS covers GAIN verbs
c. Categorial Variation: We incorporate CATVAR (Catego-
rial Variation Database) (Habash and Dorr 2003) to map be-
tween different parts of speech, e.g., winner(N) → win(V).
Basic Language Tools (see above) focus primarily on pro-
cessing verbal parts of speech (VB, VBG, VBD,...) which
may miss some asks/framings, e.g., you can reference your
gift card is an implicit ask to examine a gift card associated
with the potential victim. CATVAR enables identification of
the ask action as refer, a PERFORM verb.4
d. Verbal Processing: Verbal processing eliminates spuri-
ous asks containing verb forms such as sent or signing in We
sent you this email because you’re signing up for a new ac-
count. Verbal constraints rule out ask candidates tagged with
parts of speech VBG or VBD, thus eliminating sent (VBD)
and signing (VBG) as asks. These constraints do not apply
to framing candidates, which may carry any verbal part of
speech, e.g., you won, you are winning.
4To our knowledge, no stemming or lemmatization is as com-
prehensive as CATVAR, which incorporates numerous resources
(Brown, NOMLEX, WordNet, etc.), providing multiple variants for
any event. For example, develop is classified with developer (N),
developing (AJ), development (N), developmental (AJ), develop-
mentally (AV), and several others (a total of 16 variants). The Ask
Detection webpage includes a link to CATVAR.
3.2 Application of Structural Knowledge
a. Email structure and links: It is common for emails to in-
clude both HTML and plain text parts with similar semantic
and pragmatic content. Social engineers exploit the conven-
tional similarity between HTML and plain text by substitut-
ing malicious links and contact information where trusted
resources are expected by the user (Hadnagy and Fincher
2015). This attack pattern for deception motivates us to fo-
cus on the text/html MIME type when it is available,
activating pre-processing before the linguistic elements of
the message are analyzed. Processed HTML parts result in
text that is line split whenever div, p, br, or ul tags are
encountered for improved sentence splitting. A unique tag
is inserted as a placeholder for hyperlinks that may be re-
covered later as needed. Image tags are replaced with their
alt text. Any element that conventionally or canonically in-
dicates styling, scripting, quoting, replying, or a signature is
removed.
b. Link Positioning: Social engineers employ many
techniques to entice the potential victim to click on
links, including a wide range of different link positionings:
• Click here
Ask: PERFORM click(<URL>)5
• Click here
Ask: PERFORM click(<URL>)
• Get ready to vote for the best-looking dog.
Ask: PERFORM vote(<URL>)
• Contact me. I’m around Mon. (jw11@example.com)
Ask: PERFORM contact(jw11@example.com)
In the first three cases above, Basic link processing assigns
the link to the appropriate ask: the links are embedded
in the sentence containing the ask (PERFORM) and its
associated action (click or vote). By contrast, the fourth
entails Advanced link processing to tie together a link
with its corresponding ask-containing sentence, which is
separated by intervening material. As we will see shortly,
handling both cases increases ask-detection confidence, thus
improving the detection of top asks on a per-email basis.
3.3 Algorithmic Steps and Confidence Score
Because our approach uses linguistically-motivated rules
coupled with structural knowledge, no training data are
needed. Algorithmic steps are described below.
a. Detect Ask/Framing actions: The first step for
ask/framing detection is to extract the main action for each
clause (recursively) from the dependency tree and the con-
stituency parse shown earlier in Figure 1a,b. This is achieved
first through application of basic language tools and also
through application of CATVAR to detect actions that may
be implicit in non-verbal forms, such as reference (which
maps to the PERFORM form refer). Verbal constraints
are then applied to rule out past and progressive actions
(VBD/VBG) as asks. If ruled out, the action is considered
as a framing candidate. If not ruled out, a priority scheme
is applied, attempting to match the action against asks PER-
FORM and GIVE, in that order, from the lexical resource
5<URL> refers to the URL embedded in the link.
of interest (the thesaurus or LCS/LCS+). If this fails, an at-
tempt is made to match the action against framings LOSE
and GAIN, in that order, using the same lexical resource.
This priority scheme was devised to support overlapping
ask actions, e.g., send is both a GIVE and PERFORM in
LCS+, but in the context of a clickable link, it is deemed
a PERFORM. In this way, structural knowledge influences
the linguistic choice of ask. Similar overlap exists for fram-
ing, e.g., retrieve is both a GAIN or a LOSE, depending on
the perspective of interest. Given that our application of ask
detection is designed for SE interactions, it is assumed that
a loss is intended for the potential victim (not for the social
engineer); thus, LOSE is tested ahead of GAIN.
b. Determine Ask/Framing Arguments: Following the de-
tection of an ask or framing action, basic language tools
identify the arguments. For example, semantic role labeling
identifies $500 as ARG1 in the sentence sending $500 (see
Figure 1); this becomes an ask argument that is subsequently
assigned an ask category as described next.
c. Assign Ask/Framing Category: Categories are asso-
ciated with asks and framings, e.g., sending $500 yields
a GIVE ask with argument $500, which is in the fi-
nance money category. Other examples are shown below:
• ...using your gift card: scam gift
• Sign-up with your login and password: credentials
• ...confirm with us via this email...: personal
The categories are hierarchically organized, with a total
number of 13 categories. From this categorization it is
possible to deduce the likely goals of a would-be attacker,
for use in downstream response generation.6
d. Detect Links: Links are detected through either basic
or advanced link processing and these are associated with
ARG1 of the ask (found by basic processing tools). The ex-
istence of a link boosts the confidence score for its asso-
ciated ask. For example, a detached link is found via ad-
vanced link processing for: Contact me. I’m around Mon.
(jw11@example.com). Here, me is associated with the con-
tact email address.
e. Apply Confidence Score: Application of confidence
scores is based on preliminary trial-and-error studies and
intuitions gleaned from processing development data. Ob-
servations are: (1) Past tense events are found not to be
asks, thus assigned low or 0 confidence; (2) Non-past-tense
events are more prevalently observed to be PERFORM
asks if an ask category is specified (e.g., finance money for
sending $500 above), thus assigned high confidence (0.8);
(3) The vast majority of asks associated with URLs (e.g.,
jw11@example.com tied to me above) are found to be PER-
FORM asks, thus assigned a highest confidence (0.9); (4)
GIVE combined with any ask category (e.g., contribute $50
above) is less frequently found to be an ask, thus assigned
slightly lower confidence (0.75); and (5) GIVE by itself is
even less likely found to be an ask, thus assigned a con-
fidence of 0.6 (e.g., donate often). (Automatic confidence
scoring, training on actual data, is an area of future work.)
6Although the full description of ask/framing categories is out
of scope for this paper, these categories provided hints to the human
adjudicator for the generation of our validation set.
f. Select Top Ask: Upon completion of the processing
above, Top Ask selection produces the most important asks
at the aggregate level of a single email. This is crucial for
downstream processing of the framing and ask (i.e., auto-
matic response generation). Asks are sorted based on their
confidence scores, bringing those with the highest scores to
the top. Those tied for first place are returned as the “top
asks” for the email. For example, “PERFORM contact me
(jw11@example.com)” is returned as the top ask for Con-
tact me. I’m around Mon. (jw11@example.com).
4 Evaluation Experiments and Results
This section describes a range of different experiments to
demonstrate the impact of linguistic and structural knowl-
edge on ask/framing detection. It has been argued that the
evaluation of dialogue systems is best achieved through
comparison to a large set of human-generated responses
(Gupta et al. 2019). However, with the intermediate step of
ask/framing detection—a well-defined sub-problem of the
larger dialogue task in a social-engineering setting—it is
possible to achieve a very informative evaluation using a sin-
gle validation set with straight-forward labels.
We produce a validation set through human adjudica-
tion and correction (by a computational linguist) of initial
ask/framing labels automatically assigned by our system to
SRL-processed clauses from a held-out test set of 20 emails
(472 clauses). The emails contain examples of everyday
spam, targeted attacks by would-be social engineers, and
test emails. The resulting validation set is used as a form of
ground truth (see Ask Detection webpage) against which we
measure clause-level precision/recall/F, as described below.
The adjudication task has a throughput of about 50 labeled
clauses per hour, for a validation set size of 472 clause-level
outputs in one person-day of work. Three types of labels
are adjudicated and corrected for each clause-level output to
produce the validation set: (a) ask labels for all asks identi-
fied in each email; (b) framing labels for all framings iden-
tified in each email; and (c) the top ask (or set of top asks),
as determined by the confidence score, for each email—i.e.,
those considered the most critical, by a human adjudicator,
for downstream response generation.
Our experiments focus on the range of true posi-
tives/negatives (TP, TN) and false positives/negatives (FP,
FN) that arise with different combinations of linguistic and
structural knowledge used for ask/framing detection.7 We
judge the success of our approach at the clause level (472 ex-
tracted verb-argument excerpts) using metrics of Precision
(P), Recall (R), and F-measure (F). Test conditions for our
experiments are shown in Table 2 for cases 1–6, excluding
case 0 (thesaurus baseline). Each column includes all fea-
tures of the prior column.
Table 3 provides all experimental results. McNemar tests
were applied to determine statistical significance of per-
formance changes between consecutive cases (McNemar
1947). Asterisked(*) rows have statistically significant im-
7See TP/TN/FP/FN tallies under Experimental Details on the
Ask Detection webpage.
1 2 3 4 4 6
Orig LCS Classes Y
Class expansions Y Y
Verbal Processing Y Y Y
CATVAR Y Y Y Y
Basic Link Y Y Y Y Y
Advanced Link Y Y Y Y Y Y
Table 2: Experimental conditions for Cases 1–6
provements at 5% level.8 Statistically significant improve-
ments were found in moving from LCS to LCS+ (for Ask
and Framing), in moving from LCS+ to LCS+Verbal (for
Ask), and in moving from LCS+Verbal+CATVAR to Basic
Link Processing (for TopAsk).
5 Results Analysis: Failures and Successes
Experiments reveal that LCS+ improves detection of both
asks and framings, with more than a six-fold increase in F
over a standard thesaurus for ask detection (0.482). Higher
results are obtained for ask-detection with verbal processing
(0.496), and even higher when CATVAR is added (0.508).
Two types of structural (link) processing techniques impact
the top-ask results, ultimately achieving an F-score of 0.456,
four times higher than that of the thesaurus-only baseline
(0.094). We highlight certain cases of failure and success:
Case 0: Thesaurus.com yields 3 asks and 9 framings, and
identifies 3 top asks. F-scores are modest, 0.30 or less for
asks, framing, and top asks, e.g., take part in this conference
is correctly identified as PERFORM, but sign up is missed.
Case 1: Original LCS Classes yield more correct asks and
framings in comparison to Case 0, with more than a two-fold
improvement in F for asks (from 0.072 0.157) and a 40%
increase for framing (from 0.305 to 0.424). Unlike Case 0,
LCS classes detect sign up as a PERFORM ask. However,
false positives increase, particularly for asks (from 8 to 28),
e.g., LCS incorrectly deems we value your participation to
be a PERFORM ask. Correct top asks climb from 3 to 9,
a three-fold improvement, e.g., LCS assigns Did you send
money? as a top ask, where Case 0 fails to do so.
Case 2: LCS+ Classes increase correct asks from 8 to 34,
and increase false positives from 28 to 34, over the orig-
inal LCS with overall F-score improvements. For example,
LCS+ correctly identifies contact me as a PERFORM, where
the original LCS does not, but also incorrectly identifies you
would rather not receive as a PERFORM. False positives for
framing are reduced over the original LCS (30 to 10), e.g.,
the original LCS, but not LCS+, incorrectly detects LOSE
for dog could be a star. False positives for correct top asks
increase from 10 to 18, e.g., we sent this email is deemed a
PERFORM, mitigated by verbal processing (below).
Case 3: Verbal Processing is coupled with LCS+, to filter
past and progressive forms of predicted asks, thus eliminat-
ing sentences like we sent this email as an ask. This verbal
constraint significantly reduces false positives for asks (34 to
8Tested values were correct responses (TP or TN) vs. incorrect
responses (FP or FN), significance of change in total error rate.
Type TP TN FP FN P R F
Case 0: Thesaurus Only
Ask: 3 392 8 69 0.273 0.042 0.072
Framing: 9 422 25 16 0.265 0.360 0.305
TopAsk: 3 411 8 50 0.273 0.057 0.094
Case 1: Original LCS Classes
Ask: 8 378 28 58 0.222 0.121 0.157
Framing: 14 420 30 8 0.318 0.636 0.424
TopAsk: 9 409 10 44 0.474 0.170 0.250
Case 2: LCS+ Classes
Ask:* 34 365 34 39 0.500 0.466 0.482
Framing:* 15 437 10 10 0.600 0.600 0.600
TopAsk: 14 401 18 39 0.438 0.264 0.329
Case 3: LCS+&Verbal
Ask:* 29 384 15 44 0.659 0.397 0.496
Framing: 15 437 10 10 0.600 0.600 0.600
TopAsk: 13 407 12 40 0.520 0.245 0.333
Case 4: LCS+&Verbal&CATVAR
Ask: 30 384 15 43 0.667 0.411 0.508
Framing: 15 437 10 10 0.600 0.600 0.600
TopAsk: 13 407 12 40 0.520 0.245 0.333
Case 5: LCS+&Verbal&CATVAR&BasicLink
Ask: 30 384 15 43 0.667 0.411 0.508
Framing: 15 437 10 10 0.600 0.600 0.600
TopAsk:* 17 411 8 36 0.680 0.321 0.436
Case 6: LCS+&Verbal&CATVAR&AdvancedLink
Ask: 30 384 15 43 0.667 0.411 0.508
Framing: 15 437 10 10 0.600 0.600 0.600
TopAsk: 18 411 8 35 0.692 0.340 0.456
Table 3: Impact of combinations of linguistic and structural
knowledge on ask/framing detection.
15) over LCS+ alone.9 Correct top asks drop slightly (14 to
13) but false positives reduce significantly (18 to 12), e.g., is
being sent is eliminated as a top ask. Although verbal con-
straints do not increase correct ask types, fewer false pos-
itives enables more effective downstream response genera-
tion. Verbal constraints combined with structural processing
(below) yield more correct top asks than LCS+ alone, with
F increasing about 21% (14 to 17) for basic link processing,
and 5% (17 to 18) for advanced link processing.
Case 4: CATVAR raises true positives for asks slightly
(29 to 30) without increasing false positives (15). Top asks
remain at 13 and framings do not change. CATVAR adds
one true ask—a case where reference(N) is mapped to re-
fer(V). One explanation for CATVAR’s unanticipated low
impact is that social engineers generally do not employ verb-
nominal combinations. Example emails developed among
PANACEA team members include multi-word constructions
such as You emerge winner of $1M. This is a place where
CATVAR would have mapped to the verb win. However, true
SE data are more likely to use phrases such as You have won.
Cases 5 and 6: Basic/Advanced Link Processing lever-
ages structural knowledge, which does not impact correct
asks (as expected), but directly impacts true and false pos-
9Framing is not subject to verbal constraints; thus the number of
framings does not change (cases 2–6 remain the same for framing).
itives for top asks. Basic Link processing increases correct
top asks significantly (13 to 17) and also significantly re-
duces false positives (12 to 8), yielding significant F-score
improvement (0.333 to 0.436). For example, basic process-
ing eliminates fail to bring as an ask and advanced process-
ing adds one more correct top ask (18): open a tutorial.
6 Related Work
Security in online communication is a challenging prob-
lem, due to several issues: (1) the attacker’s speed outpaces
the ability of defenders to maintain indicators (Zhang et al.
2006); (2) the quality of phishing sites are high enough that
users ignore alerts (Egelman, Cranor, and Hong 2008); (3)
User training falls short as users quickly forget the mate-
rial and fall prey to previously studied attacks (Caputo et
al. 2013); and (4) defensive system maintainers may not al-
ways take into account the context, motivations, and socio-
economic status of the targeted user (Oliveira et al. 2017).
Numerous studies (Bakhshi, Papadaki, and Furnell 2008;
Karakasilitiosis, Furnell, and Papadaki 2006) have demon-
strated human susceptibility to SE attacks. Moving from
bots that detect SE attacks to those that produce “natural
sounding” responses and engage the attacker to elicit identi-
fying information is the next advance in this arena. We take
the first step in our work on ask/framing detection, to be used
for downstream processing by conversational agents (CAs).
CAs suffer from the problem of generating dull and
generic responses (Gao et al. 2019; Santhanam and Shaikh
2019). To address this issue, topic models are used to pro-
duce focused responses augmenting existing neural based
approaches to CAs (Dziri et al. 2018). Targeted responses
employ self-disclosure as a strategic approach for building
an engaging conversation (Ravichander and Black 2018).
For SE detection, topic models (Bhakta and Harris 2015)
and NLP of conversations (Sawa et al. 2016) are leveraged.
However, all of these approaches are limited to a pre-defined
set of topics, constrained by the training corpus.
Prior work on detecting and predicting persuasion in dis-
cussions (Hidey and McKeown 2018) leverages argument
structure as a determining factor for judging when a per-
suasive attempt might be successful. This work has been
adopted for (subreddit) forum discussions specifically dedi-
cated to changing opinions (ChangeMyView subreddit). Our
work is related to this but aims to achieve effective dialogue
for countering (rather than adopting) persuasive attempts.
Many approaches address issues above via machine learn-
ing. Structured knowledge representations of scripts embed-
ded in latent space are used to detect and compare similar
events (Li and Goldwasser 2019). This is useful for deter-
mining whether an email resembles a password reset email
typically sent from an organization’s IT department. Com-
parison of multiple responses in a chatbot setting has been
shown to improve correlation of evaluation metrics with hu-
man judgement (Prakhar Gupta and Bigham 2019). This can
be used to select a chatbot model that performs better in
an open domain. However, unlike our approach, these ap-
proaches require extensive model training.
Closest to our work is text-based semantic analysis for de-
tection of SE attacks (Kim et al. 2018). Our work differs in
that it focuses not just on detecting an attack, but on engag-
ing with an attacker in ways that leverage asks and framings.
Whereas a chatbot might be employed to warn a potential
victim that an attack is underway, e.g., based on malicious
content, our chatbots are designed to communicate with a
social engineer in ways that elicit identifying information.
Extraction of asks/frames supports generation of responses
to the attacker—with an end goal of eliciting attributable in-
formation about the attack in order to identify them.
7 Conclusions and Future work
We appeal to foundational notions of ask and framing to
characterize SE attacks for downstream response genera-
tion. We conduct experiments to determine the impact of lin-
guistic and structural knowledge on ask and framing detec-
tion, coupled with top ask selection. We make use of parts
of speech, categorial variations, and verb classes informed
by lexical-conceptual structure to yield significant precision
and recall improvements for ask and framing detection. We
also apply structural clues such as link detection for im-
proved recall of “top asks” for individual emails.
As noted earlier, categorial variations (CATVAR) pro-
vide only small improvements to ask-detection performance.
Certain types of multi-word expressions merit further inves-
tigation within the SE domain, most notably light verb con-
structions, which are not yet accommodated in our approach:
take note vs. notice, take into account vs. account for, etc.
We also expect to enrich our LCS+ classes through the
addition verbs that do not currently appear in LCS+. For ex-
ample, several thesaurus verbs for GIVE are missing from
the LCS+ verbs for GIVE: allow, commit, endow, sell. A
future goal is to use a class-based combination of multiple
resources to improve ask-detection performance compared
to using either resource alone.
We are conducting experiments to demonstrate the utility
of ask detection in an extrinsic evaluation of a conversational
agent. We hypothesize that ask detection enables more tar-
geted responses than would otherwise be generated and that
the degree of sophistication of the ask-detection component
correlates with the reliability of response generation. Exam-
ple conversations are included on the Ask Detection page.
Acknowledgments: This work was supported by DARPA
through AFRL Contract FA8650-18-C-7881 and through
Army Contract W31P4Q-17-C-0066. All statements of fact,
opinion or conclusions contained herein are those of the au-
thors and should not be construed as representing the official
views or policies of DARPA, AFRL, Army, or the U.S. Gov-
ernment.
References
[Bakhshi, Papadaki, and Furnell 2008] Bakhshi, T.; Papadaki,
M.; and Furnell, S. 2008. A practical assessment of social
engineering vulnerabilities. In Human Aspects of Information
Security and Assurance (HAISA).
[Bhakta and Harris 2015] Bhakta, R., and Harris, I. G. 2015.
Semantic analysis of dialogs to detect social engineering at-
tacks. Proc. 2015 IEEE 9th International Conference on Se-
mantic Computing (IEEE ICSC 2015) 424–427.
[Caputo et al. 2013] Caputo, D. D.; Pfleeger, S. L.; Freeman,
J. D.; and Johnson, M. E. 2013. Going spear phishing: Ex-
ploring embedded training and awareness. IEEE Security &
Privacy 12(1):28–38.
[Clayman and Heritage 2014] Clayman, S., and Heritage, J.
2014. Benefactors and beneficiaries: Benefactive status and
stance in the management of offers and requests. In Drew, Paul
and Couper-Kuhlen, Elizabeth., ed., Requesting in social inter-
action. John Benjamins Publishing Company. 55–86.
[Couper-Kuhlen 2014] Couper-Kuhlen, E. 2014. What does
grammar tell us about action? Pragmatics 24(3):623–647.
[Dalton et al. 2017] Dalton, A.; Dorr, B. J.; Liang, L.; and
Hollingshead, K. 2017. Improving cyber-attack predictions via
unconventional sensors discovered through information forag-
ing. In Proc. 2017 International Workshop on Big Data Analyt-
ics for Cyber Intelligence and Defense.
[Dalton et al. 2019] Dalton, A.; Zemel, A.; Masoumzadeh, A.;
Bhatia, A.; Dorr, B.; Mather, B.; Hebenstreit, B.; Al-Shaer, E.;
Ellisa Khoja, E. C. J.; Bunch, L.; Vlahovic, M.; Liu, P.; Pirolli,
P.; Shah, R.; Cartacio, S.; Shaikh, S.; Santhanam, S.; Dhaduvai,
S.; Strzalkowski, T.; and Karimi, Y. 2019. Modeling social en-
gineering risk using attitudes, actions, and intentions reflected
in language use. In Proc. Thirty-Second International Florida
Artificial Intelligence Research Society Conference, Sarasota,
FL, USA, May 19-22 2019.
[Dinan et al. 2019] Dinan, E.; Logacheva, V.; Malykh, V.;
Miller, A. H.; Shuster, K.; Urbanek, J.; Kiela, D.; Szlam, A.;
Serban, I.; Lowe, R.; Prabhumoye, S.; Black, A. W.; Rudnicky,
A. I.; Williams, J.; Pineau, J.; Burtsev, M.; and Weston, J.
2019. The second conversational intelligence challenge (con-
vai2). CoRR abs/1902.00098.
[Dorr and Olsen 2018] Dorr, B. J., and Olsen, M. B. 2018. Lex-
ical conceptual structure of literal and metaphorical spatial lan-
guage: A case study of push. In Proc. First International Work-
shop on Spatial Language Understanding, 31–40.
[Dorr and Voss 2018] Dorr, B., and Voss, C. 2018. STYLUS:
A resource for systematically derived language usage. In Proc.
First Workshop on Linguistic Resources for Natural Language
Processing, 57–64. Santa Fe, New Mexico, USA: Assoc. for
Computational Linguistics.
[Drew and Couper-Kuhlen 2014a] Drew, P., and Couper-
Kuhlen, E. 2014a. Requesting in social interaction. John
Benjamins Publishing Company.
[Drew and Couper-Kuhlen 2014b] Drew, P., and Couper-
Kuhlen, E. 2014b. Requesting from speech act to recruitment.
In Drew, Paul and Couper-Kuhlen, Elizabeth., ed., Requesting
in social interaction. John Benjamins Publishing Company.
1–34.
[Dziri et al. 2018] Dziri, N.; Kamalloo, E.; Mathewson, K. W.;
and Zaiane, O. 2018. Augmenting neural response gen-
eration with context-aware topical attention. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1811.01063.
[Egelman, Cranor, and Hong 2008] Egelman, S.; Cranor, L. F.;
and Hong, J. 2008. You’ve been warned: An empirical study of
the effectiveness of web browser phishing warnings. In Proc.
SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems,
CHI ’08, 1065–1074. New York, NY, USA: ACM.
[Gao et al. 2019] Gao, J.; Galley, M.; Li, L.; et al. 2019. Neural
approaches to conversational ai. Foundations and Trends R© in
Information Retrieval 13(2-3):127–298.
[Gardner et al. 2017] Gardner, M.; Grus, J.; Neumann, M.;
Tafjord, O.; Dasigi, P.; Liu, N. F.; Peters, M.; Schmitz, M.; and
Zettlemoyer, L. S. 2017. Allennlp: A deep semantic natural
language processing platform. In Proc. of Workshop for NLP
Open Source Software (NLP-OSS).
[Garfinkel and Sacks 1970] Garfinkel, H., and Sacks, H. 1970.
On formal structures of practical actions. In McKinney, John C.
and Tiryakian, Edward A., ed., Theoretical sociology: Perspec-
tives and developments. Appleton Century Crofts. 337–366.
[Gupta et al. 2019] Gupta, P.; Mehri, S.; Zhao, T.; Pavel, A.;
Eske´nazi, M.; and Bigham, J. P. 2019. Investigating evaluation
of open-domain dialogue systems with human generated mul-
tiple references. In Proc. 20th Annual Meeting of the Special
Interest Group on Discourse and Dialogue (SIGDIAL 2019).
[Habash and Dorr 2003] Habash, N., and Dorr, B. J. 2003. A
categorial variation database for english. In In Proc. Human
Language Technology and North American Assoc. for Compu-
tational Linguistics (NAACL) Conference, 96–102.
[Hadnagy and Fincher 2015] Hadnagy, C., and Fincher, M.
2015. Phishing Dark Waters. Wiley Online Library.
[Hidey and McKeown 2018] Hidey, C., and McKeown, K.
2018. Persuasive Influence Detection: The Role of Argument
Sequencing. In Proc. Thirty-Second AAAI Conference on Arti-
ficial Intelligence, 5173–5180.
[Hollingshead et al. 2019] Hollingshead, K.; Dorr, B. J.; Dalton,
A.; and Barton, M. 2019. Does outrage signal cyber attacks?
predicting ”bad behavior” from sentiment in online content.
In Proc. Thirty-Second International Florida Artificial Intelli-
gence Research Society Conference, Sarasota, FL, USA, May
19-22 2019., 185–190.
[Huma, Stokoe, and Sikveland 2019] Huma, B.; Stokoe, E.; and
Sikveland, R. O. 2019. Persuasive conduct: Alignment and
resistance in prospecting cold calls. Journal of Language and
Social Psychology 38(1):33–60.
[Karakasilitiosis, Furnell, and Papadaki 2006] Karakasilitiosis,
A.; Furnell, S. M.; and Papadaki, M. 2006. Assessing end-user
awareness of social engineering and phishing. In Proc.
Australian Information Warfare and Security Conference.
[Kazakova et al. 2019] Kazakova, V. A.; Hwang, J. D.; Dorr,
B. J.; Wilks, Y.; Gage, J. B.; and Memory, A. 2019. Splain:
Augmenting cybersecurity warnings with reasons and data.
In Proc. Thirty-Second International Florida Artificial Intelli-
gence Research Society Conference, Sarasota, FL, USA, May
19-22 2019.
[Kim et al. 2018] Kim, M.; Song, C.; Kim, H.; Park, D.; Kwon,
Y.; Namkung, E.; Harris, I. G.; and Carlsson, M. 2018. Catch
me, yes we can!-pwning social engineers using natural lan-
guage processing techniques in real-time.
[Levin 1993] Levin, B. 1993. English Verb Classes and Alterna-
tions: A Preliminary Investigation. The University of Chicago
Press.
[Li and Goldwasser 2019] Li, C., and Goldwasser, D. 2019. En-
coding social information with graph convolutional networks
forPolitical perspective detection in news media. In Proc. 57th
Annual Meeting of the Assoc. for Computational Linguistics,
2594–2604. Florence, Italy: Assoc for Computational Linguis-
tics.
[Manning et al. 2014] Manning, C. D.; Surdeanu, M.; Bauer, J.;
Finkel, J.; Bethard, S. J.; and McClosky, D. 2014. The Stan-
ford CoreNLP natural language processing toolkit. In Assoc.
for Computational Linguistics (ACL) System Demonstrations,
55–60.
[McNemar 1947] McNemar, Q. 1947. Note on the sampling
error of the difference between correlated proportions or per-
centages. Psychometrika 12(2):153–157.
[Oliveira et al. 2017] Oliveira, D.; Rocha, H.; Yang, H.; Ellis,
D.; Dommaraju, S.; Muradoglu, M.; Weir, D.; Soliman, A.; Lin,
T.; and Ebner, N. 2017. Dissecting spear phishing emails for
older vs young adults: On the interplay of weapons of influence
and life domains in predicting susceptibility to phishing. In
Proc. 2017 CHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing
Systems, CHI ’17, 6412–6424. New York, NY, USA: ACM.
[Perera et al. 2017] Perera, I. E.; Allen, J. F.; Galescu, L.; Teng,
C. M.; Burstein, M. H.; Friedman, S. E.; McDonald, D. D.; and
Rye, J. M. 2017. Natural Language Dialogue for Building and
Learning Models and Structures. In Proc. Thirty-First AAAI
Conference on Artificial Intelligence, February 4-9, 2017, San
Francisco, California, USA., 5103–5104.
[Perera et al. 2018] Perera, I.; Hwang, J.; Bayas, K.; Dorr, B.;
and Wilks, Y. 2018. Cyberattack prediction through public text
analysis and mini-theories. In Proc. 2018 International Work-
shop on Big Data Analytics for Cyber Intelligence and Defense,
3001–3010.
[Pomerantz and Fehr 2011] Pomerantz, A., and Fehr, B. J. 2011.
Conversation Analysis: An approach to the analysis of Cocial
interaction. In van Dijk, Teun., ed., Discourse Studes: A Multi-
disciplinary Approach. Sage. 165–190.
[Pomerantz et al. 2017] Pomerantz, A.; Raymond, G.; Lerner,
G.; and Heritage, J. 2017. Inferring the purpose of a prior
query and responding accordingly. Enabling human conduct:
Studies of talk-in-interaction in honor of Emanuel A. Schegloff
61–76.
[Prakhar Gupta and Bigham 2019] Prakhar Gupta,
Shikib Mehri, T. Z. A. P. M. E., and Bigham, J. 2019.
Investigating evaluation of open-domain dialogue systems
with human generated multiple references. In Proc. 20th
Annual Meeting of the Special Interest Group on Discourse
and Dialogue. Stockholm, Sweden: Assoc. for Computational
Linguistics.
[Ravichander and Black 2018] Ravichander, A., and Black,
A. W. 2018. An empirical study of self-disclosure in spoken di-
alogue systems. In Proc. 19th Annual SIGdial Meeting on Dis-
course and Dialogue, Melbourne, Australia, July 12-14, 2018,
253–263.
[Sacks 1992] Sacks, H. 1992. Lectures on Conversation, Vol-
umes 1 & 2. Blackwell.
[Santhanam and Shaikh 2019] Santhanam, S., and Shaikh, S.
2019. A survey of natural language generation techniques with
a focus on dialogue systems-past, present and future directions.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1906.00500.
[Sawa et al. 2016] Sawa, Y.; Bhakta, R.; Harris, I.; and Had-
nagy, C. 2016. Detection of social engineering attacks through
natural language processing of conversations. In Proc. 2016
IEEE Tenth International Conference on Semantic Computing
(ICSC), 262–265.
[Schegloff 2007] Schegloff, E. A. 2007. Sequence Organization
in Interaction: A Primer in Conversation Analysis. Cambridge
University Press.
[Yusupov and Kuratov 2018] Yusupov, I., and Kuratov, Y. 2018.
NIPS conversational intelligence challenge 2017 winner sys-
tem: Skill-based conversational agent with supervised dialog
manager. In Proc. 27th International Conference on Compu-
tational Linguistics, 3681–3692. Santa Fe, New Mexico, USA:
Assoc. for Computational Linguistics.
[Zemel 2017] Zemel, A. 2017. Texts as actions: Requests in
online chats between reference librarians and library patrons.
Journal of the Assoc. for Information Science and Technology
67(7):1687–1697.
[Zhang et al. 2006] Zhang, Y.; Egelman, S.; Cranor, L. F.; and
Hong, J. I. 2006. Phinding phish: Evaluating anti-phishing
tools. Technical report, Carnegie Mellon University.
